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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
that the Borgia case was controlling here and reversed the lower court.5
Application of the "continuing treatment" rule to subsequent
injuries sustained at the hospital is welcome. For, the same policy
considerations supporting the rule where treatment is for the original
injury also apply to any other injuries sustained during hospitalization.
CPLR 214(6): Flanagan rule strictly limited by Second Department.
Under CPLR 214(6), an action to recover damages for malpractice
must be commenced within three years. The historic rule in this state
concerning medical malpractice is that this statute of limitations runs
from the time when the alleged malpractice occurs.6 This general rule
was modified in Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital,7 wherein
the Court of Appeals held that the above statute commences to run upon
discovery by plaintiff in cases in which the defendant negligently fails
to remove a foreign object from plaintiff patient's body.8 Is Flanagan
a first step toward complete rejection of the general rule or merely an
exception necessitated by special equities inherent in foreign body
cases only?
In Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases9 the Supreme Court,
Kings County, and the Appellate Division, Second Department, de-
dined to further modify this rule. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged
that he discovered in 1967 that his tissue specimen taken in 1959 had
been falsely diagnosed as malignant. In 1969, plaintiff brought an action
charging defendants with negligence and seeking damages for the
administration of unnecessary radiation therapy. There was no allega-
tion that defendants knowingly concealed the slides of the aforemen-
tioned tissue from plaintiff. Whether the action was timely commenced
depended upon whether said statute began to run at the time of the
alleged negligence or upon discovery. The supreme court and the
Second Department, refusing to equate misreading of slides with failure
to remove foreign objects, dismissed the action as barred by the statute
of limitations.' 0
However, in light of the factual situation in Borgia, it is clear that the court dispensed
with the former requirement that the continuing treatment be similar in nature to that
which gave rise to the cause of action, 36 App. Div. 2d at 52-53, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 10,
citing 12 N.Y.2d at 160, 187 N.E.2d at 781, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (Froessel, J. dissenting.)
5 36 App. Div. 2d at 53, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
6 See Conklin v. Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930), afg 229 App. Div. 227, 241
N.YS. 529 (Ist Dept).
7 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR
214, supp. commentary at 77-78 (1969).
8 Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.YS.2d at 26.
9 36 App. Div. 2d 31, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't 1971).
10 Id. at 31-32, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 675-76.
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The Second Department disapproved of further contraction of the
general rule concerning diagnostic negligence through suspension of
the running of the statute until the time of discovery could have been
made if plaintiff were diligent.1 The court opined "that the preference
for repose which the Statute of Limitations reflects outweighs in this
case the disadvantage to the plaintiff which results from the applica-
tion of the general rule."' 2 In support of the rule it cited natural im-
pairment of memory due to lapse of time and possible subjection of
defendants to claims arising from medical advances subsequent to the
time of the alleged malpractice under litigation.'3 That plaintiff may
not discover the malpractice in time to litigate was no obstacle: igno-
rance of a cause of action does not of itself affect the tolling of the
statute.14
The resolution of the Schiffman case- strict limitation of Flana-
gan - complies with current New York law but not with justice. The
general rule requires further revision. The interests of protecting a
defendant from stale claims should not outweigh the interests of a
plaintiff who did not know and could not have known of the defen-
dant's malpractice.' 5 Commentators have urged that the statute of
limitations should not start to run until plaintiff discovers or with due
diligence should have discovered the malpractice.16 This position has
been adopted by the California courts,17 as the Second Department
noted.'8 Nevertheless, in New York, a plaintiff must institute his action
within three years from the date of the malpractice or, if the "con-
tinuous treatment" rule 9 applies, within three years from termination
of treatment, irrespective of when the alleged malpractice could or
should have been discovered with due diligence. Legislative reconsider-
ation of this rule is clearly warranted.
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 301: Satisfaction of requirements of commerce clause necessarily
comports with due process.
11 Id. at 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
12 Id., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
'aId., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
14 Id. at 34, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 678, citing 509 Sixth Avenue Corp. v. New York City
Transit Authority, 15 N.Y.2d 48, 51, 203 N.E.2d 486, 487, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (1964).
157B McKINNEY'S CPLR 214, supp. commentary at 77 (1969).
16 See, e.g., 29 U. Prr. L. REv. 341 (1967); 21 RUTGERs L. Rv. 778 (1967).
17 Thompson v. County of Fresno, 59 Cal. 2d 686, 381 P.2d 924, 31 Cal. Rptr. 44
(1963); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967); Calvin
v. Thayer, 150 Cal. App. 2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
18 36 App. Div. 2d at 35, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
19 See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319
(1962).
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